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I
DCgen (1200-1253) >s onc the most outstanding and unique Buddhists 
in the history of Japanese Buddhism. He is unique in at least the following 
three senses.
First, rejecting all existing forms of Buddhism in Japan as unauthentic, he 
attempted to introduce and establish what he believed to be the genuine Bud­
dhism, based on his own realization which he attained in Sung China under the 
guidance of the Zen Master Ju-ching (Nyojo, 1163-1228). He called it “the 
Buddha Dharma directly transmitted from the Buddha and patriarchs.” He 
emphasized zazen' (seated meditation) as being “the right entrance to the 
Buddha Dharma” in the tradition of the Zen schools in China since Bodhi­
dharma, originating from Sakyamuni Buddha. Yet he strictly refused to speak 
of a “Zen sect,” to say nothing of a “Soto sect,” that he was later credited 
with founding. For Dogen was concerned solely with the “right Dharma,” 
and regarded as its “right entrance.” “Who has used the name ‘Zen 
sect’? No buddha or patriarch spoke of a ‘Zen sect.’ You should realize it is a 
devil that speaks of ‘Zen sect.’ Those who pronounce a devil’s appellation 
must be confederates of the devil, not children of the Buddha.”2 He called 
himself “the Dharma transmitter Shamon Dogen, who went to China”3 with
This paper is based on a portion of a lecture series entitled “Zen and Shin Buddhism— 
Dogen and Shinran as Two Major Representatives of Japanese Buddhism” which the 
author delivered at Columbia University during the Spring Semester of 1966.
‘ &W
2 Sbobcgenzd, ed. Eto Sokuo. Iwanami-bunko edition (Tokyo: Iwanami
Shoten, 1942) II (Butiudo p. 217.
2
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strong conviction that he had attained the authentic Dharma that is directly 
transmitted from buddha to buddha, and that he should transplant it on 
Japanese soil. Thus he rejected the idea of mappo4 i.e., the last or degenerate 
Dharma, an idea with wide acceptance in the Japanese Buddhism of his day. It 
may not be too much to say of Dogen that just as Bodhidharma transmitted 
the Buddha Dharma to China, he intended to transmit it to Japan.
« ** s
6 The collection of Dogen’s discourses in Japanese, presently edited in 95 books or fasci­
cles , which he delivered from 1231 to 1253. See p. 124
Secondly, though Dogen came to a realization of the right Dharma under 
the guidance of a Chinese Zen master whom he continued to revere throughout 
his life, the understanding of the right Dharma is unique to Dogen. With re­
ligious awakening and penetrating insight, Dogen grasped the Buddha Dharma 
in its deepest and most authentic sense. In doing so, he dared to reinterpret the 
words of former patriarchs, and even the sutras themselves. As a result, his 
idea of the right Dharma represents one of the purest forms of Mahayana 
Buddhism, in which the Dharma that was realized in the Buddha’s enlighten­
ment reveals itself most profoundly. All of this, it is noteworthy, is rooted in 
Dogen’s own existential realization, which he attained in himself through long 
and intense seeking. Based on this idea of the right Dharma, he not only re­
jected, as stated above, all existing forms of Buddhism in Japan, but also severely 
criticized certain forms of Indian and Chinese Buddhism, though, it is true, he 
generally considered Buddhism in these two countries as more authentic than 
that in Japan.
The third reason Dogen is unique in the history of Japanese Buddhism, is 
because of his speculative and philosophical nature. He was a strict practicer 
ofz^zew, who earnestly emphasized sbikafitaza3, i.e., just sitting. His whole life 
was spent in rigorous discipline as a monk. He encouraged his disciples to do 
the same. Yet he was endowed with keen linguistic sensibility and a philo­
sophical mind. His main work, entitled Sbobogcirzo* "A Treasury of the Right 
Dharma Eye,” perhaps unsurpassable in its philosophical speculation, is a 
monumental document in Japanese intellectual history. In Dogen, we find a 
rare combination of religious insight and philosophical ability. In this re­
spect, he may be well compared with Thomas Aquinas, bom twenty five years 
after him. *6
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He wrote his main work, Sbdbogenzo, in Japanese, in spite of the fact that 
leading Japanese Buddhists until then had usually written their major 
works in Chinese. Dogen made penetrating speculations and tried to express 
the world of the Buddha Dharma in his mother tongue by mixing Chinese Bud­
dhist and colloquial terms freely in his composition. The difficult and unique 
style of his Japanese writing is derived from the fact that, in expressing his 
own awakening, he never used conventional terminology, but employed 
a vivid, personal style grounded in his subjective speculations. Even when 
he used traditional Buddhist phrases, passages, etc., he interpreted them in 
unusual ways in order to express the Truth as he understood it. In Dogen, the 
process of the search for and realization of the Buddha Dharma and the specu­
lation on and expression of that process are uniquely combined.7
7 Dogembu (A Collection of Dogen) ed. Tamaki Koshiro, Nibon no Sbiid II (Tokyo: 
Chikuma Shobo, 1969), p. 4.
8 The twenty seventh chapter “Lion’s Roar Bodhisattva.” [Taisho. Vol. 12, p. 522 c]
9 Since the Chinese characters sbirtuu do not make distinction between singular 
and plural, tbits mm means both “all being” in its entirety and “all beings” in their indi­
viduality. Dogen actually uses the term in these two meanings according to context.
In this paper I shall discuss Dogen’s idea of Buddha nature, which may be 
regarded as a characteristic example of his realization.
n
In the opening of the Buddha nature book of Sbobogeirzo, Dogen quotes the fol­
lowing passage from the Nirvana Sutra: —
H > Qnai no sbujo wa kotogotoku bussbdoyusu; Nyorai v>a jdjuniibite benyaku arukoto 
natbi), “All sentient beings without exception have the Buddha nature: 
Tatbdgata (Buddha) is permanent with no change at all.”8 This well express­
es the fundamental standpoint of Mahayana Buddhism. In the passage two 
important themes are emphasized: “All sentient beings have the Buddha 
nature,” and “Tathagata abides forever without change.” These two themes 
are inseparable from one another.
Against this traditional reading, Dogen dares to read as follows: "bsai v>a 
tbujo nari; sbitsuu wa buuho nori; Nyorai wa jSjumibite mu nori, u nari, benyaku nari:99 
“All is sentient being, all beings are (all being is)9 the Buddha nature;
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Tatbdgata is permanent, non-being, being, and change.”10 Since gramma­
tically speaking, this way of reading is unnatural and might even 
be termed wrong, why does Dogen read it in this manner? It is because this 
is the only way for Dogen to express clearly what he believes to be the funda­
mental standpoint of Mahayana Buddhism. It is more important for him to 
rightly and correctly convey the Buddhist truth than to be grammatically cor­
rect. The crucial point in Dogen’s reading is the four Chinese characters of 
the first part of this passage, ——traditionally read (All sentient 
beings) “vntbout exception have the Buddha nature,” which he changes to 
read “All beings are the Buddha nature.” Why did Dogen believe that this 
strange way of reading more appropriately expresses the Buddhist truth? To 
answer this question I must explain the traditional interpretation of the 
sentence.
10 Dogensbu p. 146.
« «£ 12
First, the term rfo/511, sattva in Sanskrit, means all the living, i.e., living 
beings which are in samsara, the round of birth-and-death. Buddhist texts show 
that the term sbujo is interpreted in one of two ways: in its narrow sense it refers 
to ‘human beings,’ and in its broad sense, ‘living beings.’ Accordingly, lssai no 
sbujo wa kotogotoku bussbo o yuiu means that not only human beings but also all 
other living beings have the Buddha nature. Buddha nature (bussbo12 in Japanese, 
buddhata in Sanskrit) refers to Buddhahood or the nature that enables man to 
become buddha, that is, to attain enlightenment. The second part of the pas­
sage, Nyorai u>a jojunisbite benyaku arukoto nasbiy “Tatbdgata is permanent, with 
no change at all”expresses the eternal, unchangeable truth a buddha awakens to.
Here one can see that in Buddhism human beings and other living beings are 
similar in that they have the Buddha nature and the capacity for attaining 
enlightenment. In this understanding, however, Buddhism must imply a basic 
dimension common to human beings and other living beings. This common 
dimension may be said to be sbdmetsusei utpadanirodba, the generation­
extinction nature. Man’s ‘birth-and-death’ (sboji £.#) is a human form of 
‘generation-and-extinction’ which is common to all living beings. Although 
the problem of birth-and-death is regarded in Buddhism as the most funda­
mental problem for human existence, Buddhism does not necessarily approach
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this as a ‘birth-death’ problem on a ‘human’ dimension, but as a ‘generation­
extinction’ problemon a dimension of‘living beings.’
Unless we are liberated from the very nature of generation-extinction common 
to all living beings, we human beings cannot rightly be liberated from man’s 
birth-death problem. This is the reason why, in Buddhism, it is emphasized 
that man is in samsara, the endless round of transmigration from one form of 
life to another, and why man can be said to attain nirvana only by freeing himself 
from this endless round.
According to traditional Buddhist doctrine it is said that shufi transmigrate
through six realms of existence: naraka-gati (the realms of hell), preta-gati 
(the realm of hungry ghosts), tiryagyoni-gati (the realm of animals), asura-gati 
(the realm of fighting spirits), manusya-gati (the realm of human existence), 
and deva-gati (the realm of heavenly existence). This concept of transmi­
gration was derived from pre-Buddhistic Brahmanism, and was a reflection 
of the then world-view. We need not take the number six for the realms of exist­
ence seriously. What is essential in this connection is that these six kinds 
of living beings including human existence are all interpreted as transmigrat­
ing in one and the same dimension, the dimension of generation-and-extinction. 
Here one can see the dehomocentrism in the Buddhist understanding of man’s 
basic problem and his salvation from it. An old Japanese poem says:
Listening to the voice of a singing mountain bird,
I wonder if it is my [dead] father
Or my [dead] mother.
The poet expresses his feeling of solidarity with all living beings that may 
transmigrate from one form of life to another. A bird thereby may have been 
one’s father or mother, brother or sister in a previous life. This feeling of soli­
darity is inseparably connected with the realization of the generation-extinc­
tion common to all living beings.
In the West and in the East as well, the Buddhist idea of transmigration is 
often misunderstood as a transmigration simply from man to animal and from 
animal to other forms of life—without an awareness of its dehomocentric 
nature. If the idea of transmigration indicated a flow, in the homocentric dimen­
sion, from man to animal life and so on, it would be unacceptable. Dehomo­
centrism in this connection means to transcend the dimension of man’s birth-
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and-death to that of living beings’ generation-and-extinction. Transmigration 
as samsara is emphasized in Buddhism simply because man’s birth-death prob­
lem is believed to be fully solved only in the dehomocentric or transhomo- 
centric dimension, i.e., the dimension of generation-extinction common to all 
living beings. And nirvana as the emancipation from samsara is understood to 
be attained only on this wider basis.
Accordingly, regarding the Buddhist idea of transmigration in terms of 
dehomocentrism, the following two points must be observed. First, the Bud­
dhist idea of transmigration has nothing to do with animism, which believed 
in anima which exists apart from human bodies and things, and animates them, 
(although the above-cited poem might be understood to suggest an animistic 
idea.) The Buddhist idea of transmigration is not based on a belief in the in­
dependent existence of spirit, or soul, nor on the idea of the stream of life> but on 
the realization of generation-and-extinction at each and every moment. In reality the 
endless transmigration is inseparably connected with the realization of momentary 
generation-and-extinction. Here one can see the endlessness of transmigration 
as regards temporality.
Secondly, the so-called six realms of transmigratory existence do not neces­
sarily mean that six different worlds stand somewhat side by side. For human 
beings this world is understood to be the human world in which animals and 
the like are living. For animals, however, this world is the animal world in 
which human beings are living as well. In this sense it is not that there are six 
worlds existing somewhere side by side, but that the boundless horizon of 
generation-extinction opens up, in which six kinds of transmigration are taking 
place. This shows the boundlessness of transmigration in its spatiality.
Thus transmigration in terms of dehomocentrism is endless and boundless 
in time and space. This endless and boundless dimension is nothing but the 
dimension of generation-extinction, in which, in the name of sbujo man and 
other living beings are not discriminated from each other. This means that 
Buddhism does not give a special or superior position to man over and 
against other living things with regard to his nature and salvation.
In this respect Buddhism is largely different from Christianity. As the 
Genesis story shows, Christianity assigns man the task of ruling over all other 
creatures and ascribes to him alone the imago dei through which he, unlike other 
creatures, can directly respond to the word of God. Man’s death is understood
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as the “wages of sin,” the result of his own free acts, i.e., rebellion against the 
word of God. Here, one can see homocentrism among creatures in Christianity. 
Accordingly, in Christianity there is a clear distinction between man and 
other creatures regarding their nature and salvation, with the former being 
given prominence over the latter. This homocentric nature is essentially 
related with Christian personalism in which God is believed to disclose himself 
as personality and in which a dialogical I-Thou relation between man and 
God is essential.
Then, does not Buddhism establish any distinction between man and other 
creatures? Is it that, in Buddhism, man has no special significance among 
creatures? The very realization of dehomocentrism is possible only to human 
existence which has self-consciousness. In other words, it is by transcending 
the human limitation that one comes to realize man’s birth-death as an essential 
part of a wider problem, i.e., the generation-extinction problem common to 
all living beings. This self-transcendence is impossible apart from “self-con­
sciousness” on the part of human beings. Like human beings, animals, asura, 
and so on are all undergoing transmigration, equally confined by the nature 
of generation-extinction. Unlike human existence, however, other living 
beings cannot know transmigration as transmigration. Since only man who 
has self-consciousness can realize the nature of generation-extinction as such, this 
becomes for man a “problem” to be solved rather than a “fact.” When a “fact” 
becomes a “problem” the possibility of solving the problem is also present, 
i.e., the possibility to be liberated from transmigration. Because of this peculiar­
ity of man, Buddhism emphasizes the need for him to practice Buddhist dis­
cipline to attain enlightenment while he, though transmigrating endlessly 
through other forms of life, exists as a man. ‘The rare state of man’ is, in Bud­
dhism, highly regarded; one should be grateful he is bom a man, for it is more 
difficult to be bom a man than for a blind turtle to enter a hole in a log floating 
in an ocean. Unlike other creatures, man is a‘thinking animal,’13 being endowed 
with the capability of carrying out the Dharma. Here one can see the Buddhist 
notion of man’s special position among all living beings. In this sense, Bud­
dhism may be said to be homocentric as well.
13 Sanskrit “mamqya”, like the English term “man”, is etymologically connected with 
“jman ”■—to think. Nakamura Hajime, The Ways of Thinking of Eastern Peoples (Tokyo: 
Japanese National Commission for UNESCO, i960), pp. 108-no.
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Further, the realization of transmigration is a personal realization for one’s 
self (ego), not for human existence in general. Apart from one’s self-realization 
there can be no “problem” of birth-and-death, generation-and-extinction. 
Only through one’s self-realization one can attain nirvana by solving the 
problem of generation-extinction, i.e., the problem of samsara.
Buddhism is, it must be noted, primarily concerned with the liberation of 
human existence. In this respect it does not differ from Christianity. Yet, what 
Buddhism believes to be the fundamental problem for human existence, i.e., 
the problem of man’s birth-and-death, can be solved not through a personal­
istic relationship with the word of God, but, as described above, only when 
the very nature of generation-extinction common to all living beings is done 
away with.
This refers to the fact that, while both Christianity and Buddhism are con­
cerned primarily with the salvation of human existence, their bases for salvation 
differ:14 in Christianity it is personalistic, whereas in Buddhism it is cosmo­
logical. In the former, the personal relationship between man and God is axial, 
with the universe as its circumference; in the latter, man’s personal suffering 
and salvation is accounted for in the impersonal, boundless cosmological 
dimension which embraces even a divine-human relationship.15
14 Nishitani Keiji, “The Personal and the Impersonal in Religion,” The Eastern Buddhist, 
New Series Vol. ID: No. I pp. 4-5.
15 See p. 58.
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The Buddhist position indicates that if one attains enlightenment by free­
ing oneself from generation-extinction, all living beings simultaneously and in 
like manner are enlightened by being liberated from generation-extinction. 
This is simply because the generation-extinction itself, common to man and 
other creatures, is thereby overcome, and the unchangable Reality is now dis­
closed universally. According to a Buddhist tradition, upon his enlightenment 
Sakyamuni exclaimed: “Wonderful, wonderful! How can it be that all sentient 
beings are endowed with the intrinsic wisdom of the Tatbdgata?”16 Even though 
one believes he has himself attained enlightenment, if, from his point of view, 
other creatures are not enlightened as well, his enlightenment is not genuine. 
With one's realizing the Buddha nature, the possibility of which is possessed 
by every person, all living beings attain their Buddha nature. This is the 
meaning of the above quoted phrase from the Nirvana Sutra, “All sentient 
beings have the Buddha nature.”
16 See Miura Isshu & Ruth Fuller Sasaki, Zen Dust (Kyoto: The First Zen Institute of 
America in Japan, 1966), pp. 253-5.
m
What is Dogen’s position in relation to this traditional understanding, why 
does he reject it and why does he read the phrase from the Nirvana Sutra in his 
peculiar way? Against the ordinary reading of the passage, “All living beings 
without exception have the Buddha nature/’ Dogen reads it, especially the 
four Chinese characters ^^f^t±as follows: “All beings are the Buddha nature?* 
According to the traditional reading, it is understood that all living beings 
have the Buddha nature within themselves as the potentiality of becoming a 
buddha. Naturally this reading implies that, although all living beings are at 
this moment immersed in illusion, they can all be enlightened sometime in the 
future because of their potential Buddhahood. The Buddha nature is then 
understood as an object possessed and aimed at to be realized by the subject 
(living beings). In this understanding dichotomies of subject and object, poten­
tiality and actuality, within and without, present and future, and so on are 
implied. This results in a serious misunderstanding of the basic standpoint of 
Buddhism. The traditional understanding of the Buddha nature not only does
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not represent the right Dharma of Buddhism which Dogen mastered and 
confirmed in himself but it is also against it. Thus he rejected the ordinary 
way of reading the passage with all the above implications, and gave a new 
reading, even though it meant violating grammatical rules, to clarify the right 
Buddha Dharma. As a result he reads sbitwu wa bussbo nori, meaning “All 
beings are the Buddha nature.”
This involves a complete, radical reversal concerning the Buddha nature’s 
relation to living beings.
Diagram 2
Traditional View y Ddgen’s View
For, in this understanding, the Buddha nature is not a potentiality, like a 
seed, which exists within all living beings. Instead, all living beings, or more 
exactly, all beings, living and nonliving, are originally Buddha nature. It is 
not a potentiality to be actualized sometime in the future, but the original, 
fundamental nature of all beings. In order to elucidate these two different under­
standings of the Buddha nature and to clarify Ddgen’s unique position, the 
following four points must be carefully observed: first, the dehomocentric 
nature of Buddhism; second, the nonsubstantial character of the Buddha nature; 
third, the nonduality of “all beings” and the “Buddha nature”; fourth, the 
dynamic idea of “impermanence-Buddha nature.”
[ I ] The (kbomocentric nature of Buddhitm. As I stated earlier, in Buddhism 
the problem of birth-and-death, the fundamental problem of human existence, 
is not necessarily treated as a birth-death (iboji) problem merely within the 
‘human’ dimension, but as a generarion-extinction (jbomctsu) problem within
37
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
the total ‘living’ dimension. It is in this dehomocentric, living dimension that 
the Buddhist idea of transmigration (samsara) and emancipation from it 
(nirvana) are understood. By emphasizing “All beings are the Buddha nature” 
Dogen carries the dehomocentrism of Buddhism to its extreme, by going beyond 
the ‘living’ dimension. ‘All beings,’ needless to say, includes living as well as 
non-living beings.
The dimension of all beings is no 
longer that of generation-extinction, 
but that of appearance-disappearance 
(kimetm or being-nonbeing
(umu #&). The ‘living’ dimension, 
though transhomocentric, has a life­
centered nature that excludes nonliv­
ing beings. The ‘being’ dimension, 
however, embraces everything in 
the universe, by transcending even 
the wider-than-human ‘life-centered’ 
horizon. Accordingly the ‘being’ di­
mension is truly boundless, free from 
any sort of centrism, and deepest 
precisely in its dehomocentric nature.
Diagram 3
Diagram 4
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When Dogen emphasizes “all beings” in connection with the Buddha nature, 
he definitely implies that man’s samsara, i.e., recurring cycle of birth-and-death, 
can be properly and completely emanicapted not in the ‘living’ dimension, but 
in the ‘being’ dimension. In other words, it is not by overcoming generation­
extinction common to all living beings, but only by doing away with appear­
ance-disappearance, or being-nonbeing common to all beings, that man’s 
birth-death problem can be completely solved. Dogen finds the basis for man’s 
liberation in a thoroughly cosmological dimension. Here Dogen reveals a most 
radical Buddhist dehomocentrism.
Accordingly, one may readily understand why Dogen refuses the ideas of 
permanent ego or dtman, and of organicism. In the Buddha nature book Dogen 
severely attacks as not representing the genuine Buddhist standpoint the 
Senika heresy,17 which emphasizes the immutability ofatmantx selfhood and the 
perishability of the body, a view whose western equivalent may be the Platonic 
immortality of the soul or the Cartesian thinking ego. In the same book he also 
refutes as false the view of those who think “the Buddha nature is like the seeds 
of grasses and trees. When it is well wetted and nourished by the Dharma rain, 
it may bud and shoot out branches, leaves, and fruit themselves swelled with 
seeds.”18 This is a teleological or organicistic view of the Buddha nature. The 
Aristotelian idea of dynamis and energeia, and various Renaissance philosophies, 
might perhaps be cited in comparison.
17 Sec p. 145.
18 Sbdbdgeirzjj I (Rutiho &■&), p. 317.
iW.p. 316.
Rejecting these two views altogether, Dogen often emphasizes that 
“Throughout the universe nothing is ever closed.”19 This clearly refers to the 
complete disclosure of ‘all beings’ Qbitsuu\ including man, living and non­
living beings within the limitless universe, which is radically dehomocentric 
and ontological.
[ 2 ] Tfo non-substantial character of Buddha nature, Dogen’s idea, “All 
beings Qhittuu) are the Buddha nature,” as discussed above, opens up a limit­
less dimension for the Buddha nature. In Dogen, the Buddha nature, the 
ultimate Reality, is realized precisely in this infinite and ontological dimension 
in which all beings can exist respectively as they are. This idea of the Buddha 
nature may suggest Spinoza’s idea of God as Substance which is also called
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“nature” and which is absolutely infinite, with finite beings as His “modes.” 
Despite real similarities between them, Dogen’s idea of the Buddha nature is 
radically different from Spinoza’s idea of God precisely because Dogen’s 
Buddha nature is not a substance.
In the Buddha nature book Dogen says, “What is the essence of the World 
Honored One’s (Sakyamuni) words ‘Everything is a living being: all beings 
are the Buddha nature’? They are a verbal preaching of‘What is it that thus 
comes?’ ”20The question “What is it that thus comes?” is found in the conversa­
tion that took place at the first meeting between the sixth Patriarch Hui- 
neng (Eno, 638-713) and Huai-jang of Nan-yiieh (Nangaku Ejo, 677-744).
20 Sbobogenzol (Bttubo), p. $1$. 21
The Patriarch asked: “Whence do you come?”
“I come from Tung-shan.”
“What is it that thus comes?”
Nan-yiieh did not know what to answer. For eight long 
years he pondered the question, then one day it dawned 
upon him, and he exclaimed, 
“Even to say it is something does not hit the mark.”
The question, “What is it that thut^immo m)comes?” 21 that Huai-jang took 
eight years to solve refers to the Buddhist Truth, and in Dogen’s present case, 
to the essential point of the words, “All beings are the Buddha nature.” Even 
the first question “Whence do you come?” is not an ordinary question. Zen 
often indicates the ultimate Reality beyond verbal expression by interrogatives 
as well as by negatives such as “nothingness” and “emptiness.” An interroga­
tive “what” or “whence” is that which cannot be grasped by hand, that which 
cannot be defined by intellect; it is that which can never be objectified: it is 
that which one can never obtain, no matter what he docs. Indeed, “what” or 
“whence” is unknowable, unnamable, unobjectifiable, unobtainable, and 
therefore limitless and infinite. Since the Buddha nature is limidess and bound­
less, without name, form, or color, it can be well, indeed best, expressed by 
such an interrogative. This is the reason Dogen finds the essence of his idea 
“All beings are the Buddha nature” precisely in the question “What is it that 
thus comes?”
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This does not, however, mean that for Dogen Buddha nature is something 
unnamable, and unobtainable, something limitless and boundless. If the Buddha 
nature were something unnamable it would not be truly unnamable because 
it is something named “unnamable.” If the Buddha nature were something limit­
less it would not be really limitless because it is limited from something limited. 
Therefore, for Dogen the Buddha nature is not something unnamable, but tbe 
unnamable. Yet, at the same time tbe unnamable is tbe Buddha nature. The Buddha 
nature is the limitless, yet at the same time tbe limitless is tbe Buddha nature. This 
simply means that for him the Buddha nature is not something whatsoever, even 
in a negative sense: in other words it is not substantial at all. Accordingly, an 
interrogative such as “what” or “whence” does not represent the Buddha nature. 
If it did, then the Buddha nature would have to be something existing behind and 
being represented by “what.” Since the Buddha nature is not substance, “what” 
is immediately the Buddha nature and the Buddha nature is immediately 
“what.”
This being so, the question “What is it that thus comes?” is completely a 
question, and the word “what” is also thoroughly an interrogative. Yet, at 
the same time “what” is not a sheer interrogative, but is the Buddha nature. 
Again “What-is-it-that-thus-comes” is not a mere question, but is a realization 
of the Buddha nature.
Spinoza’s idea of God as Substance is of course not something. Since in 
Spinoza God is the Substance ofso-called substances, He is really infinite and the 
one necessary being. However, Spinoza’s idea of God as Substance cannot in 
itself be properly called “what,”—though it might be so called from the side 
of relative substances and finite beings—because “Substance” is that which 
is in itself and is conceived through itself; it can be conceived independently of 
the conception of anything else.22 In other words, for Spinoza God may be said 
to be “what,” but it is not that “what” is God. This is because in Spinoza God 
is Substance.
22 Ethics, tr. by R. H. M. Elwes, in Philosophy of Benedict de Spinoza (N.Y.: Tudor Pub­
lishing Company, n.d.) Part I, def. 3.
The difference between Dogen’s idea of the Buddha nature and Spinoza’s 
idea of God as Substance may be clearer if we take into account their relations 
to things in the universe. In Spinoza the One God has, in so far as we know, two
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“attributes/’ thought(cogitatw) and extension (extemio); particular and finite 
things are modifications, being called the “modes” of God, which depend upon, 
and are conditioned by, the divine and infinite being. This clearly shows the 
monistic character ofSpinoza’s idea of God from which everything else is derived 
and by which everything else is conceived. Yet, the very ideas of “attribute” 
and “mode” involve a duality between God and the World, in Spinoza’s 
terminology, between natura naturam (the active nature) and natura naturata 
(the passive nature), a duality with the priority of the former. In sharp contrast 
to this, Dogen’s Buddha nature is not natura naturam which is distinguished 
from natura naturata i.e., the created world. Accordingly, particular things in 
the universe are not “modes” of Buddha nature. Nor is there any exact equiva­
lent to Spinoza’s idea of “attribute” in Dogen’s idea of Buddha nature because 
the idea of “attribute” is meaningless in a non-substantial Buddha nature.
Then, what significance do particular things, and particular qualities have 
for the Buddha nature? Since the Buddha nature is non-substantial, no particular 
thing or particular quality in the universe corresponds to, or is represented by, 
Buddha nature. In terms of mode and attribute, for Dogen each particular thing 
is a mode of “what”; each particular quality is an attribute of “what”. A pine 
tree, for instance, is not a mode of God as Substance, but a mode of “what”, 
namely a mode without modifier. Therefore, a pine tree is really a pine tree in 
itself, no more no less. This refers to the pine tree’s “thus comes” in the above 
“What-is-it-that-thus-comes”. Again, thought is not an attribute of God as 
Substance, but an attribute of “what”, an attribute not attributed to anything. 
Accordingly, thought is just thought in itself, no more no less. This again 
refers to the thought’s “thus comes”.
When the sixth Patriarch asked Huai-jang “What is it that thus comes?” the 
question directly pointed to Huai-jang himself as an independent and individual­
ized personality that will not allow surrogarion. Huai-jang is not a creature 
determined by God as Substance. He may be said to be something coming from 
“what,” something determined without determinator. Determination with­
out determinator is self-determination, freedom, and selfhood, which are but 
different terms for the Buddha nature. If Huai-jang had realized himself as that 
which “thus comes” from “what,” he would have realized his Buddha nature. 
It took Huai-jang eight years to solve this question and say, “Even to say it is 
something does not hit the mark!”
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Huai-jang in himself is “What-is-it-that-thus-comes.” However this is not 
the case only for him. You and I as well are precisely “What-is-it-that-thus- 
comes.” Trees and grasses, heaven and earth, are equally “What-is-it-that-thus- 
comes.” Cogitatio and extensio, mind and body, are respectively “What-is-it-that- 
thus-comes.” Everything without exception in the universe is “What-is-it-that- 
thus-comes.” This is precisely the meaning of Dogen’s “All beings are the 
Buddha nature.” It is the reason Dogen recognized that the sixth Patriarch’s 
question “What is it that thus comes?” involves the essence of his above idea.
Like Dogen’s idea of the Buddha nature, Spinoza’s idea of God is eternally 
infinite, absolutely self-sufficient, self-determining, and self-dependent. How­
ever, for Spinoza, the perfect monist, the relationship between the One Sub­
stance and the multiplicity of finite beings is understood deductively. In marked 
contrast to this, in Dogen the relationship between Buddha nature and all 
finite beings is not deductive, but nondualistic, precisely because the Buddha 
nature is not One Substance. All beings without exception are equally and 
respectively “What-is-it-that-thus-comes.” Even God as the One Substance in 
Spinoza’s sense cannot be an exception to this. In other words, from Dogen’s 
point of view, God as the One Substance is, prior to being so called, “What-is-it- 
that-thus-comes.” So far, there is no difference, no deductive relation, between 
God and finite beings in the universe. This all embracing, even-God-or-Sub- 
stance-embradng “What-is-it-that-thus-comes” in itself is the Buddha nature 
in the sense of Dogen’s words, “All beings are the Buddha nature.”
Accordingly, in Dogen the Buddha nature is neither transcendent nor im­
manent. One of the characteristics of Spinoza’s philosophy lies in the immanent 
character of his idea of God—Deus sive natura (God or nature). Spinoza rejected 
the orthodox theological doctrine of a transcendent personal God who creates 
and rules the world with will and purpose. He emphasized God as the infi­
nite cause of the necessary origination of all entities. In this sense, Spinoza’s 
position is much closer to Buddhism in general, and to Dogen in particular, than 
orthodox Christianity. As Richard Kroner, however, speaks of Spinoza, “All in­
dividuality is finally swallowed up by the universality of the One God who 
alone truly Is.” 23This may be the reason Spinoza’s system is called pantheism.
23 Speculation and Revelation in Modem Philosophy (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 
n.d.), p. 126.
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In Dogen however the statement “All beings are the Buddha nature” does not 
indicate that all beings are wallowed up by the Buddha nature. Instead, as he 
stresses “Throughout the universe nothing is ever closed,” every particular 
thing in the universe manifests itself in its individuality simply because the 
Buddha nature is not a substance, but a “what.” For Dogen, all beings are “swal­
lowed up” bottomlenly by the Buddha nature; yet at the same time the Buddha 
nature is also “swallowed up” bottomlestly by all beings. This is because all 
beings (fbittuu) and the Buddha nature are nondualistic and therefore the Buddha 
nature is neither immanent nor transcendent (or both immanent and tran­
scendent). Thus, despite frequent misunderstandings to the contrary, one may 
readily notice that Dogen is not a pantheist however pantheistic his words may 
appear at first glance. Indeed, he is as unpantheistic as he is nontheistic.
IV
[ 3 ] Nonduality of “all being?* (shitsuu) and the “Buddha nature.” With 
the idea “All beings are the Buddha nature,” Dogen carries the nonhomocentric 
nature of Buddhism to its ultimate end, by transcending the dimension of 
generation-extinction (traditionally considered the realm of man’s transmigra­
tion and the basis for his liberation from it) to the dimension of appearance­
disappearance, or the dimension ofbeing-nonbeing that is common to all beings, 
living or nonliving. Again, for Dogen, only on this infinite, ontological basis 
common to all beings can man’s problem of birth-and-death be properly and 
completely resolved. However Dogen’s is not different from the traditional 
interpretation in respect that only through man’s self-consciousness is his 
radical transcendence to the dimension ofbeing-nonbeing possible. For man’s 
problem of birth-and-death is essentially a subjective problem with which each 
person must individually and consciously cope. Buddhist nonhomocentrism, 
in Dogen’s case as well, is connected inseparably with its emphasis on one’s 
self (ego) as the subject of self-consciousness. Dogen insists that, to attain the 
Buddha nature, one must transcend one’s ego-centrism, homo-centrism, and 
living being-centrism, and thereby ground his existence in the most funda­
mental plane, that is, in the ‘being’ dimension, which is the dimension of 
Dogen’s sbitsuu, i.e., “all beings.”
Accordingly, if one attains the Buddha nature in oneself by transcending and
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basing one’s existence in the ‘being5 dimension, freeing oneself from the being- 
nonbeing nature common to all beings, then everything in the universe attains 
the Buddha nature as well. For at the very moment of his enlightenment the 
being-nonbeing nature itself is overcome. It is for this reason Buddhist sutras 
often say, “Grasses, trees, and lands, all attain Buddhahood,” “Mountains, 
rivers, and the earth totally manifest the Dharma-kaya (Dharma body).” These 
passages taken objectively without one’s own existential awakening seem 
absurd, at best pantheistic. Dogen emphasizes doji-jodo,24 “simultaneous attain­
ment of the Way” which refers to the fact that everything in the universe 
attains enlightenment simultaneously at the moment of one’s own enlighten­
ment—an enlightenment that opens up the universal horizon of the Buddha 
nature. If one cannot rightfully speak of the attainment of Buddha nature 
by mountains, rivers, lands and the like, one cannot be said to realize the 
Buddha nature.
24 1*1 A it 25 Sbobogmzo I (BwrAo), p. 317.
This is a crucial point for a thorough realization of the Buddha nature through 
emancipation from birth-and-death. Although always latent in Mahayana 
tradition, this point was clearly realized and explicitly expressed in Dogen’s 
“All beings are the Buddha nature.” More important however in this connec­
tion is that unlike the dimensions of human beings and living beings, the 
dimension of all being Qbittuu), which Dogen takes as the basis for the Buddha 
nature, is limitless. There is no “centrism” of any sort at all in this dimension. 
Further, the Buddha nature which is realized by freeing oneself from the being- 
nonbeing nature common to all beings is non substantial. Therefore, even if 
Dogen emphasizes “All beings are the Buddha nature,” he does not mean by 
this an ‘immediate’ identity between all beings and the Buddha nature; rather 
the identity is established only through the realization of the limitlessness 
of the ‘being’ dimension and the nonsubstantiality of the Buddha nature—in 
short, only by the realization of “What.” This means a complete turnover of 
the immanent view of the Buddha nature, which Dogen doubly denies; first, 
by transcending the ‘living5 dimension to the ‘being’ dimension he denies the 
immanence of the Buddha nature within living beings; secondly, by emphasiz­
ing the nonsubstantiality of the Buddha nature he denies its immanenoe as the 
one cause of the world, i.e., like Spinoza’s idea of God. This double negation of 24
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the immanent view of the Buddha nature brings about a radical reversal in 
the traditional interpretation of the Buddha nature. It is the logical conclusion 
to the idea of the Buddha nature latent in Mahayana tradition, rather than a 
mere explication of its implicit elements. This results in the nonduality of all 
beings and the Buddha nature, a Buddha nature that is neither immanent nor 
transcendent. “The Buddha nature is assuredly all beings, because all beings are 
the Buddha nature?’ 25 says Dogen.
26 “No Buddha nature” refers to the ordinary idea of the term, i. e., the 
counterconcept of “Buddha nature”; “no-Buddha-nature” indicates Dogen’s idea, i. e., 
the unobjectifiable Buddha nature which is freed from ‘having’ or ‘not having’.
27 Sbobogenzo I (Bunboy p. 334. 28 ibid. pp. 321-2
To avoid man’s natural tendency to objectify and to substantialize every­
thing, and to make clear the nonduality of “all beings” and the “Buddha nature,” 
Dogen emphasizes two things: (i) the idea of “no Buddha nature”—to clarify 
the nonsubstantiality of the Buddha nature, and (2) the bottomlessness of 
‘all-being”—to deny its being objectified.
(1) In the Buddha nature book Dogen often emphasizes the idea of mubusshd,26 
no-Buddha-nature, by quoting and reinterpreting various words and conversa­
tions of old Zen masters. In one such case he quotes Kuei-shan Ling-yu (Isan 
Reiyu, 771-853): “All living beings have no Buddha nature” and says:
^akyamuni preached “All living beings without exception have the 
Buddha nature.” Kuei-shan preached, “All living beings have no 
Buddha nature.” “Having,” “not having” arc completely different 
in verbal meaning. People must have doubts as to which grasps the es­
sence. In spite of this, only “All living beings have no Buddha nature” 
excels in the Buddha Way.27
In Dogen the idea of “no Buddha nature” is not understood as peculiar to 
Kuei-shan alone. “The Way of no-Buddha-nature” Dogen says, “has been 
taught since long before, from the inner sanctuary of the fourth Patriarch. It was 
seen and heard by the fifth Patriarch Hung-jen, transmitted in Chao-chou 
and advocated by Kuei-shan. The way of no-Buddha-nature must be practiced. 
Do not hesitate?*28 Those who remember Dogen’s emphasis that “All beings 
are the Buddha nature” may be surprised by these words.
Dogen’s comment on Kuei-shan’s words is also striking.
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The reason in Kuei-shan’s words is the reason of “All beings 
have no Buddha nature.” He does not speak of vastness beyond rules 
and regulations. The sutras within one’s own house are thus pre­
served. One should grope further as to why all living beings are the 
Buddha nature, why they have the Buddha nature. If they have the 
Buddha nature they must be confederates of the devil. They bring 
a devil to add to all living beings.29
29 ibid. pp. 334-3. 30 ibid. pp. 322, 324. 31 ibid. pp. 322-3.
This is a complete negation of a traditional doctrine of the Buddha nature 
possessed by living beings. However if we penetrate Dogen’s standpoint these 
words are not merely surprising, they have deep meaning. Dogen’s idea of 
“no-Buddha-nature” is not a counterpart to the idea of “Buddha nature,” it 
is “no Buddha nature” in its absolute sense. Here we find another example of 
Dogen’s peculiar way of reading traditional texts. In the same Buddha nature 
book he quotes the following conversation between the fifth Patriarch Hung- 
jen and Hui-neng, later the sixth Patriarch, at their first meeting:
“Where are you from?”
“I am from Reinan [in the southern part of China, then considered 
uncivilized]
“What did you come for?”
“To become a buddha.”
reinanjin mubussbo (men from Reinan have no Buddha 
nature). How could you become a buddha?”
“Although there is for man north and south, there is no north and south 
for the Buddha nature.”50
Commenting on this conversation, Dogen dares to say:
This “reinanjin mubussbo” does not mean “men from Reinan have no 
Buddha nature,” or “men from Reinan have a Buddha nature,” but 
“men from Reinan, no-Buddha-nature.” “How could you become a 
buddha?” indicates “What buddha is it you expect to become?”31
Traditionally, the term mubussbo meant living beings have no Buddha
nature within themselves. However Dogen is not concerned with having or not
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having the Buddha nature but with the Buddha nature in itself which is non- 
substantial. When we concern ourselves with having or not-having the Buddha 
nature we thereby objectify it in a positive or a negative way. Since the Buddha 
nature is an unobjectifiable and unobtainable “What” it is entirely wrong to 
talk objectively whether or not one has the Buddha nature. With Hung-jen, 
Dogen emphasizes “Since the Buddha nature is empty it is called mu 
(no-thing).”32 He also stresses that “The principle of the Buddha nature is 
that it is not endowed prior to enlightenment; it is endowed after enlighten­
ment; the Buddha nature is unquestionably realized simultaneously with 
enlightenment. This principle should be penetrated in most assiduous, con­
centrated effort, even for 20 or 30 years.”33
32 ibid. p. 322 33 ibid. p. 323. 34 ibid. p. 335.
35 In the Gtnjd-koan JJt A book D6gen says, “When Buddhas are truly buddhas there 
is no need for the perception that one is a buddha. Nevertheless he is a confirmed buddha, 
performing the confirmation of buddha.”
If one realizes that living beings are fundamentally the Buddha nature there 
is no need to emphasize “having the Buddha nature.” It suffices simply to say 
that living beings are living beings. To say living beings have the Buddha 
nature is like adding legs to a snake, which is the reason Dogen says “Why are 
all living beings the Buddha nature? Why do they have the Buddha nature? If 
they have the Buddha nature they must be confederates of the devil. They bring 
a devil to add to all living beings.” Continuing, Dogen says, “While the Buddha 
nature is the Buddha nature, living beings are living beings”34—a definite state­
ment referring to his idea of “no-Buddha-nature.” The Buddha nature is abso­
lutely the Buddha nature and living beings are absolutely living beings. Yet, 
in this realization, the Buddha nature and living beings are not two different 
things, simply two aspects of one and the same living reality. Practically speak­
ing, the Buddha nature is realized as such simultaneously with enlightenment. 
It is an illusion to think that the Buddha nature is or is not endowed in living 
beings apart from enlightenment. This is why, against the ordinary reading, 
Dogen reads reinanjin mubussbo as “Men from Reinan, no-Buddha-nature,” 
meaning that men from Reinan in themselves are freed from dichotomous 
thoughts as to whether or not they have the Buddha nature. This freedom, no- 
Buddha-nature itself, is the genuine realization of Buddha nature.35 Hence 
Dogen emphasizes that both a preaching of having the Buddha nature and a
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preaching of having no Buddha nature involve defamation of Buddhism. 
Dogen’s idea of “no-Buddha-nature” clearly indicates the nonsubstantiality 
of the Buddha nature by rejecting both the “eternalist” view which sub­
stantializes and is attached to the idea of the Buddha nature, and the “nihilistic” 
view which also substantializes and is attached to the idea of no Buddha nature.
(2) For Dogen, just as the Buddha nature is nonsubs tan tial, “all beings” 
(sbitsuuj) are unobjectifiable, limitless and groundless.
As stated earlier, Dogen emphasizes “All beings Qbitsuu) are the Buddha na­
ture” by changing the ordinary readingof the passage in the Nirvana Sutra which 
had been traditionally read as “All living beings Qbujdj) without exception 
have the Buddha nature.” In this case Dogen broadens not only the meaning 
of the term “Buddha nature,” but also that of the term “living beings”(rfo/j). 
In the Buddha nature book, immediately after saying “All beings are the Buddha 
nature,” he continues “All beings in their entirety are called sbujS. Just at the 
right moment, living beings (jbujdj) both inside and outside are all beings Qbi- 
tsuu) of the Buddha nature.”36 This means that Dogen broadens the meaning 
of sbujo, which traditionally referred to living or sentient beings, to include 
non-living beings or non-sentient beings. In other words he ascribes life to 
non-living beings, sentiments to non-sentient beings, and ultimately mind and 
the Buddha nature to all of them. Thus he states:
36 Sbobogetrzo I (Amxx/xT), p. 315. Another interpretation of — M which is, in
the present text, translated “All beings in their entirety,” is “A part of all beings” (is 
called sbujo). Dogen’s view in Diagram 2 follows this interpretation.
37 ibid. p. 333.
In what is called in the Buddha Way all living beings Qbujdj), all 
beings that have mind are sbujo, because mind is sbujo; all beings that 
have no mind must equally be sbujo because sbujois mind. Therefore, all 
mind is sbujif; all sbujo is ‘having the Buddha nature.’ Grasses, trees, 
and lands are mind; being mind, they are sbujo; being sbujS, they have 
the Buddha nature. Sun, moon, and stars are mind; being mind, they 
are sbujo; being sbujo, they have the Buddha nature.37
Thus we see that for Dogen, living beings Qbujty, all beings Qbitsuu), mind, 
and the Buddha nature are ultimately identical.
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However strongly Dogen emphasizes the idea All beings are the Buddha 
nature” the concept of “all beings” (sbitsuu) is not a counterconcept to non- 
being. It is “all beings” in its absolute sense which is beyond and freed from the 
opposition between being and nonbeing. This is clearly shown in the follow­
ing:
Beings one and all now caused to exist by the Buddha nature are not 
‘being’ of being-nonbeing....The term “all beings” (sbitsuu) is further­
more not a being that has beginning,38 or the Original Being,39 or a 
mysterious being,40 or the like; and it is of course not conditioned be­
ing41 or illusory being.42 It has nothing to do with mind-and-object, 
substance-and-form, etc.43
38 39 ** 40
41 42 43 SbobogenzolCBtusbo)' p. 315.
It is noteworthy to point out that in this passage Dogen insists that “all 
beings” (rbitsuu) does not mean the “Original Being,” such as might be inter­
preted as an equivalent to the Heideggerian “Sein,” because the Original 
Being is that which discloses itself as the place in which beings exist. Heidegger 
establishes ontologiscbe Differenz (ontological difference) which essentially 
differs from ontiscbe Differenz (ontich difference: that merely distinguishes one 
being from another). By establishing ontologiscbe Differenz Heidegger thema­
tically questions the sense of Sein (Being), the idea of which is implied as 
being self-evident in the everyday experience of various beings He
thereby constructs Fundamental-Ontologie in order to elucidate the significance 
of Sein des Seienden (Being of beings) that is concealed in everyday understanding. 
In contrast to this, Dogen does not make an ontologiscbe Differenz, not because 
he is unaware of the essential difference between Being and beings, but simply 
because he deliberately denies the idea ofS?i«, ontologically distinguished from 
Seiendes. Hence his emphasis on the idea of “no-Buddha-nature.”
A question however must remain here. Why, in Dogen, is sbitsuu or “all 
beings” referred to in the plural form while sbitsuu is said to be identical with 
the Buddha nature? If “all beings” is not Sein in the Heideggerian sense, is 
not then “all beings” the ground of (Teltans ebuung in which everything in­
cluding God, nature, man, life, and so on, is systematically grasped? Definitely
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not, as Dogen’s previously quoted words on “all beings” already clearly show. 
Then what are “all beings” (fbitsuu)? Beings (Sefaufa) are, needless to say, 
not Being (Sein), and vice versa. However all beings are just all being, no more 
no less; nothing is outside of them. For all being, there is no possibility even for 
ontologiscbe Differenz. All beings are really and absolutely all beings—through 
the mediation of nothing. This is precisely the meaning of “All beings are 
the Buddha nature.”
In Heidegger as well nothingness is essential in his quest for Being. Sein 
sei bit (Being itself) or Sein als solches (Being as such), we are told, must be held 
down into Nothingness, it must appear as nothing, in order to be.44 *In Dogen 
however Sciences als solches (beings as such) must appear as nothing in order to 
be. This is because the dimension of “all beings” (sbitsuu) is limitless and 
bottomless without a further embracing, deeper dimension, without the 
ultimate ground, even in the Heideggerian sense of Sein als solches, or in the 
traditional Buddhist sense of the Buddha nature, from which all beings come 
to present (atwesen).
44 The Encyclopedia of Philosophy ed. Paul Edwards (N.Y. The Macmillan Company &
The Free Press, 1967), vol. 3, p. 463.
This may be clearer when we take into account Dogen’s remarks on the 
term “thus” (immo) which appears in the words “What-is-it-that-/2w-comes,” 
words which Dogen takes as an adequate expression of the Buddha nature. 
In the Immo book of Sbobogenzo, based on Huai-jang’s words, Dogen emphasizes 
that immo is unobtainable, not-xwna is unobtainable, both immo and not-j/n^w 
are unobtainable. This clearly shows that in the words “What-is-it-that-thus- 
comes” “thus” (immo)) is not simply affirmative. Rather it is neither affirmative 
nor negative. The genuine “thus” is the kind of “thus” freed from both affirma­
tion and negation. Accordingly, when Dogen says the essence of “All beings 
are the Buddha nature” is well expressed in the words “What-is-it-that-thus- 
comes,” all beings appear in this sense of “thus.” And the very fact that all 
beings “thus” appear from “What” indicates “All beings are the Buddha 
nature.” Zen’s household expressions, “Willows are green; flowers are red,” 
“Mountains are really mountains; waters are really waters,” simply indicate 
this. We may fully concur: “I am really I: you are really you.” Yet, at this 
very moment—all beings are the Buddha nature. Seiendes als solches “thus” come
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to present (iwnpwH)from “What.” Only when the Heideggerian idea of ontolo- 
giscbe Diffirenz is overcome can Dogen’s idea of “All beings are the Buddha 
nature” be truly understood.
V
[ 4 ] The dynamic idea of “impermanence-Buddha nature.” I have stated 
that Dogen on the one hand insists “All beings are the Buddha nature,” and 
on the other emphasizes “no-Buddha-nature.” This he did to reject the com­
mon view that objectifies and substantializes “all beings” and the “Buddha 
nature,” and to clarify their nondual is tic and dynamic oneness. Dogen’s 
characteristic idea of “no-Buddha-nature” (mubussbo) already serves this pur­
pose as it denies both the etemalist view and the nihilistic view of the Buddha 
nature. To make, however, definitely clear the nondualistic and dynamic 
oneness of “all beings” and the “Buddha nature,” Dogen goes further by 
saying “mujo (impermanence) is the Buddha nature.”
In Hegel the contradistinction of Being and Nothing sets the dialectic in 
motion, and the unity of Being and Nothing is Becoming (Werden). In Dogen 
w«j5-^«jZ»45(impermanence-Buddha nature) is the unity of Buddha nature and 
no Buddha nature. Mujo (anitya in Sanskrit, impermanence, mutability, trans- 
ciency) has been one of the key concepts of Buddhism from its very beginning, 
one of the three basic Buddhist principles46—“Whatever is phenomenal is 
impermanent.” In Buddhism the impermanence or mutability of phenomena 
had been emphasized in contrast with permanence or immutability of the 
Buddha nature or the Tathdgata (Buddha). Dogen however insists that im­
permanence is the Buddha nature. He quotes the following words of Hui- 
neng:
46 =. The other two are “Nothing has an ego” and “Tranquil nirvana.”
47 SbobogeirzA I (*Bk«£o)» p. 325.
The sixth Patriarch taught his discipleHsing-ch‘ang(Gyosho) that 
impermanence in itself is the Buddha nature, that permanence is good 
and evil, each and every phenomenal thing, and discriminating mind.47
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This again may sound surprising to the ear of one who holds to a stereotyped 
understanding of Buddhism. The task of Buddhism is to emancipate oneself 
from impermanence or samsara and to enter nirvana by attaining the Buddha 
nature. However, if nirvana is sought for simply beyond impermanence it is 
not true nirvana because it stands against impermanence and thereby is still 
related to and limited by impermanence. The true nirvana is attained only by 
emancipating oneself even from nirvana as transcendence of impermanence. 
In other words, it is realized by complete return to the world of impermanence 
from nirvana through liberating oneself from both impermanence and perma­
nence, from both samsara so-called and nirvana so-called. Therefore genuine 
nirvana is nothing but realization of impermanence as impermanence. If one 
remains in ‘nirvana’ by transcending samsara one must be said to be still selfish 
because he loftily abides in his own enlightenment apart from the sufferings 
of the samsara-bound sentient beings around him. The true compassion can 
be realized only by transcending ‘nirvana’ to return to and work in the midst 
of the sufferings of the ever changing world. This is the characteristic realiza­
tion of Mahayana Buddhism, which emphasizes “Do not abide in samsara, or 
nirvana.” This complete no-abiding is the true nirvana in the Mahayanist 
sense. Hui-neng’s words quoted above are one Zen expression of this idea.
When Dogen quotes Hui-neng to the effect that “mujo (impermanence) in 
itself is the Buddha nature” he carries the Mahayanist standpoint to its logical 
conclusion. As stated before, by stressing “All beings are the Buddha 
nature” Dogen goes beyond the dimension of living beings to that of beings, 
and makes explicit the implication of Mahayana Buddhism that even 
nonliving, nonsenrient beings can attain Buddhahood. The dimension of be­
ings was that of appearance-disappearance or being-nonbeing. This dimension, 
embracing all beings, sentient or nonsentient, may be said to be the most 
thoroughgoing dimension of mujo i.e., impermanence. In other words, it is only 
in Ddgen’s emphasized dimension of “all beings” that the time-honored Bud­
dhist idea of mujo is fully and completely realized. It is precisely through the 
realization of impermanence in this sense that one can properly state of his own 
enlightenment that grasses, trees, and lands disclose the Buddha nature.
Not only that, by emphasizing “All beings are the'Buddha nature,” Dogen 
radically turned over the traditional view of the Buddha nature. The dimension 
of “all beings” was limidess and bottomless, to the extent it cannot properly
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be called a measurable dimension. For Dogen who grounded his own exis­
tence in this dimensionless dimension of all beings, there is a mutual interpenet­
ration between the “Buddha nature” and “all beings”: the Buddha nature is 
neither immanent nor transcendent in relation to all beings.
Diagram 5
The dynamic and nondualistic structure of “All beings are the Buddha 
nature” or “impermanence-Buddha nature.”
B— c
Restated in connection with the idea of impermanence, when Dogen reaches 
the dimension of “all beings,” impermanence common to all beingsis thoroughly 
realized ar impermanence, no more no less. Apart from this thorough realization 
of impermanence there is no realization of the Buddha nature. However, in this 
very realization that underlies Mahayana Buddhism, Dogen achieves a com­
plete and radical reversal, a reversal from the realization of “the impermanence 
itself being the Buddha nature” to the realization of “the Buddha nature in 
itself being the impermanence.” His idea of mup-buisbo, i.e., “impermanence- 
Buddha nature,” is the outcome of this reversal. It can also be seen in the 
following passage in which he develops the words of the sixth Patriarch.
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The very impermanence of grasses, trees, bushes, and forests is the 
Buddha nature; the very impermanence of man, things, body, mind is 
the Buddha nature; states, lands, mountains, rivers are impermanent, 
because they are the Buddha nature. The supreme and complete en­
lightenment is impermanent because it is the Buddha nature. Great 
nirvana is the Buddha nature because it is impermanent. Those holding 
various narrow views of the two vehicles [the hearer and the self­
enlightened], Buddhist scholars of the scriptures and commentaries 
and the like may be suspicious of, surprised and frightened by these 
words of the sixth Patriarch. If they are they are a confederation of 
devil-heretics.48
48 ibid. pp. 325-6. 49 ibid. II (Hostbd pp. 283-4.
For Dogen, impermanence itself is preaching impermanence, practicing im­
permanence, and realizing impermanence, and this, as it is, is preaching, 
practicing, and realizing the Buddha nature.
Spinoza looked at everything under the aspect of eternity (sub specie aetemi- 
tatis). In marked contrast, Dogen looked at everything under the aspect of 
impermanence. In Spinoza, time seems to be effaced or conquered by the 
one Substance. Transciency is surpassed by the perfect stability of truth 
in its ultimate sense. But for Dogen transciency is indispensable; apart 
from it there is no such thing as eternal substance. Time is realized as 
“being” which is beyond both continuity and discontinuity. Rejecting the 
etemalist view Dogen states:
To learn, in speaking of substance, there is no flowing for water 
and no growth and perishing for trees is heresy, ^akyamuni Buddha 
said “Such is form; such is substance.” Accordingly, flowers opening, 
leaves falling in themselves are substance of suchness. Nevertheless 
fools think there can be no flower opening, no leaf falling, in the 
realm of True Essence.49
In emphasizing change and motion Dogen is more akin to Hegel than 
Spinoza. As “Becoming” in Hegal is the unity of Being and Nothing, “mujo- 
bussho” (impermanence-Buddha nature) in Dogen is the unity of the Buddha 
nature and no Buddha nature.
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One cannot doubt that negation and contradiction are the vital notions in 
Hegel’s account of the dialectic. For Hegel neither pure Being nor pure No­
thing is true, and only Becoming as their unity (Einbeit) or unseparateness 
(fJngetrenntbeif) is their truth. In his Science of Logic, referring to Being and 
Nothing he says:
The truth is not their lack of distinction, but that they are not the 
same, that they are absolutely distinct, and yet unseparated and in­
separable, each disappearing immediately in its opposite. Their truth is 
therefore this movement, this immediate disappearance of the one 
into the other, in a word, Becoming: a movement wherein both are 
distinct, but in virtue of a distinction which has equally immediately 
dissolved itself.50
50 Science of Logic tr. by W. H. Johnston & L. G. Struthers, (London: George Allen & 
Unwin Ltd. 1929), Vol. I, p. 95. I/^iitenicbaft der Logik herausgegeben von Georg Lasson 
(Leipzig, Felix Meiner. 1923) P. B. Erster Teil: S. 67.
This is strikingly similar to Dogen’s idea of mujo-bmsbd. However, dispite 
Hegel’s emphasis on the unseparateness and the mutual passing over fUber- 
gehen) of Being and Nothing, it cannot be overlooked that in his system Being 
is prior to Nothing. In Hegel the Beginning fAnfangf) of everything is Being 
as such, and his dialectic movement develops itself in terms of Being (thesis), 
Nothing (antithesis), and Becoming (synthesis). It never involves a movement 
in terms of Nothing (thesis), Being (antithesis), and Becoming (synthesis). 
Being as such is the supreme principle of Hegel’s metaphysical logic. In so far 
as it is so, however dialectic “Becoming” as the unity may be it is not a genuine 
Becoming but a quasi-Becoming which is after all reduced to Being. And, by 
asserting that there is a final synthesis, his system cut off all further develop­
ment: it swallowed up future and time itself. For all its dynamically fluid, 
dialectical character, his system is consistently supported in an irreversible, 
one-directional line with Being as the Beginning.
On the other hand, Dogen’s idea of “no-Buddha-nature” is already freed 
from the contradiction between Buddha nature and no Buddha nature. Herein 
'Buddha nature’s possible priority over ‘no Buddha nature’ is overcome. When 
he goes further and comes to the point of “impermanence-Buddha nature,”
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Dogen consciously denies any possible trace of final duality, i.e., the possible 
priority of ‘no Buddha nature’ over ‘Buddha nature’ possibly implied in the 
very idea of “no-Buddha-nature.” Hence in the idea of mup-busshti, i.e., “im- 
permanence-Buddha nature” every kind of duality and every sort of priority 
of one against the other is completely overcome. There is no irreversible rela­
tion. Everything is dynamically interrelated yet distinct. Thus Dogen’s idea 
of “impermanence-Buddha nature” is not a Becoming that can be reduced 
either to Being, Buddha nature, or to Nothing, impermanence. Rather it is a 
genuine “Becoming” of which we can, after Hegel, legitimately say:
They [the impermanence of all beings and the Buddha nature] are 
not the same. They are absolutely distinct, and yet unseparated and 
inseparable, each disappearing immediately in its opposite. Their 
truth is therefore this movement—in a word, Becoming.
Becoming in this sense is seen in the following Dogen’s words:
To think the Buddha nature exists only during one’s life and ceases 
to exist at death is the utmost in ignorance and superficiality. During 
life there is the ‘Buddha nature’ and ‘no Buddha nature.’ In death as 
well there is the ‘Buddha nature’ and ‘no Buddha nature’.... Nonethe­
less the attachment to false views that the Buddha nature exists or 
not according to whether there is motion or not, that it functions or 
not in proportion to consciousness or no-consciousness, or that it ceases 
as the Buddha nature or does not cease according to whether it is 
perceived or not, is heretical.51
51 Sbobogenzo I (BiwAo), p. 343.
Therefore, “Becoming” in Dogen’s sense is not a synthesis, which presupposes 
two things as its basis, of Being and Nothing, Buddha nature and imperman­
ence. Instead, this “Becoming” itself takes place in the boundless, dimension­
less dimension of “all beings,” which is truly cosmological. This leads us to 
sum up the essential differences between Hegel and Dogen as follows:
I. Taking the “absolute Mind” as the philosophical foundation, the 
basis of Hegel’s system is still personalistic, not completely
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dehomocentric or cosmological; while the basis of Ddgen’s 
system is completely dehomocentric and cosmological.52 *
52 “Cosmological” here does not refer to the cosmos created by or distinguished
from God, but to the cosmos in its broadest sense in which even “God” is embraced.
2. Accordingly, in Hegel the development of concept (Begriff'), 
though dialectic, is ultimately a one-directional and closed 
system; in Dogen everything is reversible and mutually inter­
penetrating, thereby consisting an open system. The more 
cosmological the basis is, the more personalistic mind is, and vice 
versa. (This may be termed “cosmo-personalistic.”)
3. In Hegel, because emphasis on the final synthesis is stronger than 
contradictory opposition, an individual finally loses its individual­
ity. This is seen in his term List der Vernunft (artifice of reason) 
which manipulates individual figures through passion in history. 
Since for Dogen, the Buddha nature is thoroughly nonsubstantial, 
all beings are all beings, inseparable from each other yet with­
out losing individuality.
4. Despite his emphasis on “The truth is the Whole” and “The 
ultimate truth is Subject” there is working in Hegel’s system a 
hidden objectification which speculates the whole. In marked 
contrast, based on Zen practice, i.e., seated meditation, in Dogen 
every objectification is overcome and dynamic nonduality between 
‘subject’ and ‘object,’ self and the universe is achieved.
5. Again, despite his emphasis on time and history Hegel’s speculative 
dialectic, which is often called panlogicism, ultimately turns 
them into motionless eternity. In Dogen, however time is being 
and being is time. Becoming as ‘impermanence-Buddha nature’ 
involves paradoxical unity of time and eternity at each and every 
moment.
All of these differences arc based on a completely radical reversal of Being and 
Nothing; in Ddgen’s case, between the Buddha nature and the impermanence— 
from “impermanence is the Buddha nature” to “the Buddha nature is im­
permanence”—which is lacking in Hegel. For Dogen, all beings, impermanence,
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and the Buddha nature are identical, with the realization of impermanence as 
dynamic axis.
VI
The four items given above outlines, I hope, Dogen’s idea of the Buddha 
nature in its ontological structure. However his position is not exhausted by 
an ontology of the Buddha nature nor by a philosophy of “all beings.” Not 
solely a thinker, Dogen was originally an ardent religious practicer who empha­
sized sbikantaxa, just sitting, and devoted himself fully to faith in the Buddha 
Way. Mujo (impermanence) of all things was not, in Dogen, the nature of the 
world viewed with a philosophical eye but the pain and suffering of all sentient 
beings and the universe felt by a religious mind. In fact, it was this imperma­
nence that drove him as a youth to renounce the world and seek the truth. 
Mujobussbd, i.e., “impermanence-Buddha nature,” was the consummation 
of his final realization “All beings are the Buddha nature.”
Dogen’s idea of “All beings are the Buddha nature” cannot be fully under­
stood apart from his idea of “oneness of practice and enlightenment.”53 The 
latter as well as the former is the solution, realized in his own enlightenment, 
for the question that he encountered as a young monk; “Both exoteric and 
esoteric Buddhism teach the primal Buddha nature and original enlightenment 
of all sentient beings. If this is the case, why then do all buddhas and bodhisatt­
vas arouse the longing for enlightenment and engage in ascetic practice?”54 
This concerns the Tien t‘ai idea of “original awakening”55 that is contrasted 
with “acquired awakening”.56 Why should man engage in religious practice to 
overcome illusion if he is already endowed with the Buddha nature and is 
originally enlightened? Christian equivalent to the question may be theodicy, 
which concerns with the reality and origin of evil in the universe, a creation 
of an all-powerful and all-good God.
54 Kenztiki (Dainibon bukkyd zensbo, Vol. 115, Tokyo, 1922); also see Heinrich
Dumoulin: A Hiitary of Zen Buddhism (N.Y. McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1965), p. 153.
” ** 56
An emphasis on “original awakening” that is a priori, fundamental to all 
living beings and eternal, is apt to become pantheistic or mystical, neglecting
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ethical and religious practice. On the other hand, an emphasis on “acquired 
awakening,” which an unenlightened one can attain a posteriori only through 
various stages of practice, is inclined to become idealistic or teleological, setting 
enlightenment far afield as an end. The relationship between original and 
acquired awakening is a dilemma involved in Mahayana Buddhism, particularily 
in T*ien t‘ai school with which Dogen started his Buddhist studies. It is how­
ever not theoretical. It is the practical problem par excellence.
After serious struggles with this problem, Dogen, through Zen practice 
and his own enlightenment, rejects sheer original awakening as a naturalistic 
heresy that regards man’s mind itself as buddha by identifying the given human 
self-consciousness with true awakening. Accordingly, he emphasizes the im­
portance and necessity of practice: “Although this Dharma [the Buddhist 
truth] is amply present in every person, unless one practices, it is not mani­
fested; unless there is realization, it is not attained.”57 At the same time Dogen 
also rejects an idea of a mere acquired awakening as an unauthentic Buddhist 
teaching which distinguishes practice and enlightenment, taking the former 
as a means to the latter as an end. In consequence, he emphasizes oneness of 
practice and enlightenment saying,“To think practice and realization are not 
one is a heretical view. In the Buddha Dharma, practice and realization are 
identical. Because one’s present practice is practice in realization, one’s initial 
negotiating of the Way in itself is the whole of original realization. Thus, even 
while one is directed to practice, he is told not to anticipate a realization apart 
from practice, because practice points directly to original realization.”58 Thus by 
rejecting both the naturalistic-pantheistic and the idealistic-teleological views 
of the Buddha nature Dogen breaks through the relativity of “original” and 
“acquired” awakening and opens up a deeper ground that is neither a priori 
nor a posteriori. This very ground is the original Awakening in its absolute sense 
because it is prior to and liberated from any dualistic thought, any discrimina­
tory view. For Dogen it is the “immaculate” Buddha nature that is realized in 
z/jxzw, seated meditation which he calls “body-and-mind-casting-off.”59 It is 
not an original awakening looked at and aimed at from the point of view of
57 Sbobogenzo I {Bendova I# Ut IS), p. $5. See p. 128.
58 ibid. p. 6$-6. See p. 143. »
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acquired awakening. Conversely it is the original Awakening that embraces 
the relativity of original and acquired awakening taking it as its own develop­
ment. This is the reason Dogen emphasizes “One should practice within en­
lightenment”60 and “As enlightenment is already in practice, enlightenment is 
endless: as it is practice in enlightenment, practice is beginningless.”61 For 
Dogen the Buddha nature manifests itself regardless of man’s illusions and en­
lightenment. Both practice and enlightenment are beginningless and endless. 
There is nothing standing against the Buddha nature in its immediacy. 
Throughout the universe nothing is ever closed, all beings always manifest the 
Buddha nature just as they are ever changing.
60 Sbobogenzo I (Bendowa), pp. 66-67. 61 ibid. p. 66.
62 See p. 135
Accordingly, Dogen’s position of “oneness of practice and enlightenment” 
combined with “All beings are the Buddha nature” completely overcomes the 
following three dualities:
I. The duality of subject and object. When Dogen emphasizes “All 
beings art the Buddha nature” instead of “All living beings have 
the Buddha nature” subject-object structure is already over­
come. The Buddha nature is no longer an object that is possessed 
and aimed at to be realized by the subject (living beings), but 
subject (all beings) and object (Buddha nature) are identical, com­
bined by “are.” Yet they are not immediately identical because all 
beings are limitless and the Buddha nature is nonsubs tan rial. 
Through the realization of impermanence they are dynamically 
nondualistic yet one. Here realizer and the realized are one and 
the same. Even a distinction between creator and creature does 
not exist because the realization of “All beings are the Buddha 
nature” is based on dehomocentric, cosmological dimension. 
Oneness of practice and enlightenment, an exceedingly human and 
personal problem, is realized not on a personalistic basis but on 
the limitless cosmological basis. Hence simultaneous attainment 
of a zjzzw practicer and everything in the universe. This is also the 
reason Dogen emphasizes self-enlightenment qua enlightening 
others.62
6l
THE EASTERN BUDDHIST
2. The duality of potentiality and actuality. The Buddha nature is 
not a potentiality to be actualized sometime in the future but 
originally and always the basic nature of all beings. At each and 
every moment in the ever changing movement of all beings in­
cluding men, the Buddha nature manifests itself as “suchness” or 
“thus-comes.” Since “suchness” or “thus-oomes” is the Buddha 
nature, Dogen says as stated before that “The principle of the 
Buddha nature is that it is not endowed prior to enlightenment 
.... The Buddha nature is unquestionably realized simultaneous­
ly with enlightenment.” Therefore, for Dogen the distinction 
of Buddha nature and Buddha is also overcome. The simultaneity 
of the Buddha nature and enlightenment (Buddha) is realized only 
here and now at each and every moment. From this point of view 
the theological ideas of “participation” and “anticipation” are not 
acceptable because, though dialectical, they imply the ultimate 
Reality beyond “here and now.” They look to be well aware of 
man’s finitude but are lacking a keen realization of impermanence 
common to all beings, which is fully realized only “here and 
now” at each and every moment in the ever changing world.
3. The duality of means and end. Practice in itself that is, as a means, 
approaching enlightenment as an end, is an illusion. With such 
a practice one may infinitely approximate but never reach the 
“end,” thereby falling into a falseendlessness (G. tcblechte Unendiich- 
keit'). In the very realization of the illusory character of such a 
practice one may find oneself at the real starting point for life be­
cause in this realization one realizes that the Buddha nature is not 
the end but the basis of practice. Even in an initial resolution to 
attain enlightenment the Buddha nature fully manifests itself. Do- 
gen says, “Both the moment of initial resolution and the moment 
of attaining highest enlightenment are the Buddha Way; begin­
ning, middle,and end equallyare the Buddha Way.”63 For Dogen re­
ligious conduct, i.e.,initial resolution,practice,enlightenment,and
63 Sbobogetrzo II (Senbin-sesibo <<•' p. 208.
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nirvana, consists of an infinite circle, where every point is its 
starting point as well as its end.
Accordingly Dogen’s rejections of a mere ‘acquired awakening’ and practice­
enlightenment duality do not involve a negation of ethical and religious 
practice. Rather they imply a strong emphasis on the importance of pure 
practice, because for him realization is fully functioning at every step of practice 
in so far as it is undefiled. Practice as such is a manifestation of realization. His 
apparently contradictory emphasis on “Do not intend to become a buddha”64 
refers to a realm free of human agency in which practice (zzjszw) is pure 
practice. This pure practice, undefiled zazen, in itself is realization— 
simply because it is practice (zazen) of body-and-mind-casting-off. On the 
other hand, Dogen’s rejection of a sheer ‘original awakening’ and emphasis on 
practice does not indecate a negation of the ontological basis for the practicer. 
It simply denies the notion of given enlightenment, innate Buddha nature. 
It involves a recognition that men are immersed in the midst of illusion and 
suffering in this floating world and that there is no self-existing Reality apart 
from this fact. Here we should notice Dogen’s words, “Buddhism has never 
spoken of nirvana apart from birth-and-death.”65 Illusions and sufferings origi­
nate from a lack of right and full realization of the impermanence of man and the 
world, and from a false idea of Reality apart from this impermanence. A rejec­
tion of the defiled idea of‘original awakening’ that itself is given beyond im­
permanent phenomena and a direct realization of impermanence as im­
permanence immediately enables one to awaken to Reality here and now, 
liberated from illusions and sufferings. This awakening is originally functioning 
precisely in the impermanence of the world. It is through undefiled practice 
that this original Awakening in its authentic sense is awakened to.
M MBDttW iM.U(Zaxengi p. 323.
65 ibid. vol. I (Bendowa)) p. 69.
Oneness of practice and enlightenment is realized only in the realm of un­
defiled practice and awakening—practice undefiled by an intention to become 
a buddha, and awakening undefiled by projective thinking beyond imperma­
nence. In other words only by being freed from human agency both in the aspect 
of practice and enlightenment is Dogen’s idea of oneness of practice and en-
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lightenment realized. However, this undefiled realm is not static but highly 
dynamic, because through zazen it opens up directly under one’s existence, 
here and now at each and every moment the practicer is freed from human 
agency.
Practically speaking, in Dogen this freedom from human agency indicates 
faith in the Buddha Way, religious spirit, and compassion. Dogen’s following 
words emerge from that realm:
One who practices the Buddha Way above all should have faith in 
the Buddha Way.66
66 Gakudo-yojinsbi Zenji Goroku H ed. Oku bo Ddshu.
Iwanami bunko edition (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1941), p. 42.
67 ibid. p. 26.
68 Sbobcgenxo II (Hotsvbodaitbin £ # ft p. 407.
69 Hokydki "2 ft ft. ed. Ui Hakuju, Iwanami-bunk6 edition (Tokyo; Iwanami Shoten, 
1940), p. 44-
To begin with, the practice of the Buddha Dharma is not done for 
one’s own sake. And of course not for the sake of fame and wealth. 
One should simply practice the Buddha Dharma for its own sake.67
The resolve to attain supreme enlightenment is the issuance and 
act of a vow to save all sentient beings prior to one’s own salvation.68
The zazcn of buddhas and patriarchs is a prayer to gather and appro­
priate the entire Buddha Dharma from the time of initial resolution. 
Accordingly, their does not forget or reject living beings; their 
compassionate thought always extends even to insects, and their 
earnest desire is to save them and to transfer all merits to all things.69
However, the realm of undefilement with its accompanying faith and com­
passion is not merely the goal but the starting point of Buddhist life, because 
without realization of faith and compassion one cannot have a real point of 
departure for this life. And only in the undefiled realm in which oneness of 
practice and enlightenment is realized is the idea uAll beings are the Buddha 
nature” as well rightly realized.
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Dogen’s idea of “oneness of practice and enlightenment” necessarily leads 
us to an examination of his view of r/mz, because that idea overcomes another 
important duality—time and eternity. His view of time in connection with the 
Buddha nature is clearly seen in still another example of his peculiar way of 
reading traditional texts.
In the Buddha nature book Dogen quotes the following passage from the 
Nirvana Sutra: (BussbSnogi o
shiran toomobaba masani jisetsu no innen o kanxubesbi: Jisetsu moshi itareba bussbo genzen 
su\ “To wish to know the meaning of the Buddha nature one should contem­
plate the causal relation of time and occasion. If the time comes the Buddha 
nature will manifest itself?’70 This traditional reading implies waiting for the 
time of the Buddha nature’s manifestation sometime in the future through 
present practice: unless the time comes the Buddha nature is not manifested, 
however one may engage in practice. This reading presupposes the Buddha 
nature as a potentiality like a seed contained within living beings, a view 
Dogen severely rejects. Accordingly he changes the reading: 
tokan jisetsu innen,“ Just rrr the causal relation of time and occasion,’71 instead of 
“one should contemplate the causal relation of time and occasion,” and 
jisetsu nyakusbi, “the time and occasion thus come,”72 instead of “if the time and 
occasion come.” Ddgen’s aim is clear. He rejects such an attitude as anticipa­
tion of Buddha nature’s future manifestation and clarifies the presence of the 
Buddha nature. There is no time that is not the right time.
70 Sbobogenzo, I (BmmAo), p. 318. This is not the exact quotation from the Nirvana
Sutra. It is partly based on Po-chang^s (Hyakujd) words in Renioeyo 7.
71 ibid.
™ ibid.
Ddgen’s emphasis on the idea of “All beings are the Buddha nature” may be 
regarded as referring to spatiality. The idea developed itself through “no- 
Buddha-nature” to “impermanence-Buddha nature” which implies tem­
porality. The dimension of all beings was that of appearance-disappearance, 
mutability. However, it is not to begin with there is time and then within this 
time, for example, spring comes. Nor is it that there is a time named spring and
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then, in it, flowers bloom. But flower blooming in itself is spring coming, i.e., 
time called ‘spring.’ Apart from the facts of flowers blooming, birds singing, grass 
growing, breezes blowing and the like there is no ‘spring? Apart from mutable 
phenomena of the world there is no ‘time? Dogen says “Times have colour 
such as blue, yellow, red, and white?’73 He also says,“Mountains are time, oceans 
are time. If they were not, there would be no mountain, no ocean. One should 
not think there is no time in the absolute present of mountains and oceans. 
If time decays, mountains and oceans will also decay. If time does not decay 
mountains and oceans will not decay cither.”74 There is no time apart from 
mutability or appearance-disappearance of things in the universe. Yet there is 
nothing apart from time. Thus emphasizing uji (being-time) Dogen 
says “Time in itself is being; all beings are time.”75
73 ibid. II (Kiigc p-171-
7S ibid. p. 159- 76
Dogen does not however simply identify being and time. Their common 
denominator is mutability or impermanence. For Dogen all beings without 
exception are impermanent; just because so all beings are the Buddha nature, 
for he rejects an immutable Buddha nature beyond impermanence. Here we 
have seen a radical turnover of the traditional understanding of the Buddha 
nature. Similarly Dogen makes a radical change of the common understanding 
of time. For him, time does not simply flow.
Time should not be understood simply to fly away. Flying away 
should not be learned as the only function of time. If time is subject 
to flying there may be an interval [between coming and going]. It is be­
cause time is understood as merely passing that the truth of uji is not 
truly grasped. In short, all beings of the universe are joined together, 
and each is time. Being uji it is one’s own time. Uji has the character­
istic otkydryaku16 i.e., movement.77
Against the ordinary understanding, for Dogen, time is flying, yet not 
flying; flying-y^-not flying is time’s movement. Movement as flying-yu^- 
not flying is always the present in which the Buddha nature manifests itself. In 
other words, the Buddha nature always manifests itself as time, specifically as 
present time.
74 ibid. 1 (Uji fi*$),p. 164.
77 Sbbbogpno I ( U/i), p. 161.
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Accordingly, with the realization of mutability or impermanence as dynamic 
axis, being and time are identical. The realization of universal impermanence 
involves the unity of spatiality and temporality. And just as all beings are the 
Buddha nature all times are the Buddha nature. This the Zen maxim “Every 
day is a good day” well expresses. Dogen himself expressed the same realization 
in the following poem shortly after his return from Sung China:
Morning after morning the sun rises from the east,
Every night the moon sinks in the west;
Clouds disappearing, mountain ridges show themselves,
Rain ceases, surrounding mountains are low.
When Dogen emphasizes a new reading “Just seeing the causal relation of 
time and occasion” instead of the traditional reading “One should contemplate 
the causal relation of time and occasion” he strongly rejects such ideas as 
anticipation, hope, and expectation that look for eternity beyond the present 
moment. Even an idea of anticipation or hope that involves a dialectic of “al­
ready” and “not yet” is not an exception, because the very dialectic is based 
on the idea of divine will or supreme Being. Dogen denies continuity of time and 
emphasizes the independence of each point of time as seen in his following 
words:
Wood becomes ashes and cannot return to wood again. Accordingly 
one should not regard ashes as after and wood as before. One must 
understand that wood abiding in its own state has before and after: 
though it has sequence it is cut ofTfrom before and after. Ashes in their 
own state have after and before. Just as wood does not become wood 
again after becoming ashes man does not live again after death. There­
fore not to speak of life becoming death is the confirmed way of Bud­
dhism : so this is called no-life. To sav that death does not become life•
is the regular preaching of the Buddha: so this is called no-death. 
Life is a stage of time, death is a stage of time, just as winter and 
spring. One must not think winter becomes spring, nor can one say 
spring becomes summer.78
78 ibid. I (Genjokoan), pp. 84-85.
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This indicates complete discontinuity of time negating a transition from one 
state to another, immortality of soul, and eternal life after death. Life is ab­
solutely life, death is absolutely death; spring is absolutely spring, summer is 
absolutely summer; each in itself no more no less—without the slightest 
possibility of becoming. This precisely refers to Dogen’s idea of tokan “just 
seeing” the causal relation of time and occasion. When we “just see” time and 
occasion at each and every moment there is nothing beyond it, nothing apart 
from it. Thus Dogen says “The causal relation of time and occasion should 
be seen by the causal relation of time and occasion.”79 There is no room for 
God as the ruler of time and history, the one Substance, or even the Buddha 
nature. To realize time as time is to attain the Buddha nature. For Dogen 
time is the Buddha nature and the Buddha nature is time.
79 ibid. I (TtonAo) p. Jl8. 80 ibid. p. 319. 81 ibid. I, (t/p) p. l6l.
This is the reason he changes the reading of the phrase jisetsu nyakushi from 
“ifthe time and occasion come” to “the time and occasion thus come.” In Dogen’s 
realization it is not that the fullness of time occurs at a particular time in history 
but that any moment of history is the fullness of time because for him at every 
moment time fully manifests itself. This is inseparably connected with his idea 
of complete discontinuity of time and the independence of each moment. 
Someone may be suspicious and doubt whether time and history might be 
spatialized by such ideas and thereby lose its meaning. But, conversely the 
idea of anticipation or waiting for the fullness of time in the future, however 
dialectic it may be, is not entirely freed from a naturalistic view of time. Only 
by the realization of the complete discontinuity of time and of the independent 
moment i.e., only by negation of temporality, does time become real time. For 
Dogen there is no time that is not the fullness of time. “Jisetsu nyakushi in­
dicates the time and occasion have already come. There is nothing to doubt.... 
You should know jisetsu nyakushi never involves passing time in vain... .Since 
the time and occasion have arrived, this is the manifestation of the Buddha 
nature.... There has been no time and occasion that does not ‘thus come.’ There 
is no Buddha nature that does not manifest itself.”80
However, with complete discontinuity of time and independent moment, 
time flows. This is kydryaku i.e., movement as flying-yjw-not flying. Therefore 
time’s movement is not one-directional but completely reversible.
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Uji (being-time) has the virtue of movement, it moves from today to 
tomorrow, from today to yesterday, from yesterday to today, from 
today to today, and from tomorrow to tomorrow. Since movement is 
the virtue of time, time past and time present are neither piled up 
nor congregated linearly. Therefore Ch‘ing-yuan (Seigen) is time; 
Huang-po(Obaku) is time; Ma-tsu(Baso) is time;Shih-t<ou(Seldto) 
is time. Because self and others are already time, practice and 
enlightenment are time.81
There are great similarities between Dogen’s view of time and Heidegger’s. 
Both of them emphasize the identity of being and time. In Heidegger, through 
the analysis of Dasein (man) in terms of Sorge (care), Angst (dread), and a 
being unto death, temporality is regarded as the essential nature of human 
existence. In Dogen it is through man’s self-consciousness that the problems 
of life-and-death, generation-and-extinction, and being-and-nonbeing, in 
short, the problem of impermanence, are realized as the problem to be solved. 
However at least the following three differences must be noticed:
(1) In Heidegger temporality is grasped particularly through the 
analysis of human existence, while in Dogen impermanence is realized 
emphatically as the universal nature of all beings in the universe. 
This is because Dogen grounds his existence on the radically deho- 
mocentric, cosmological dimension whereas Heidegger is not altoge­
ther freed from homocentrism, though he emphasizes transcending 
to the world.
(2) In Dogen, through the realization of impermanence of all 
beings, the dimension of which is limitless and bottomless, not only 
that being is time but also that time is being is clearly realized. On the 
other hand, in Heidegger it is clear that being is time but not clear 
that time is being even in the thought of his later period.82
(3) Dogen’s idea of ‘impermanence-Buddha nature’ results in the 
realization of simultaneous enlightenment for man and nature. His idea 
of reversible ‘movement’ involves the realization of contemporaneity
92 However, in his recent book Z«r Sacbe dei Denluru (Max Neimeyer, Tubingen, 1969), 
Heidegger discusses "Zeir und Scirf' (Time and Being) emphasizing as a “gift” of
“it” (B gibt) in which time and being are inseparable.
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of infinite past and infinite future in terms of the Buddha nature.; pro­
gression is regression and regression is progression—in the awaken­
ing to “What.” However we cannot find the exact equivalent of 
these ideas in Heidegger.
In Dogen the impermanence of the universe and the movement of time are 
inseparable. The mediating point of these is man’s sustained practice and 
realization. His ideas of the oneness of being and time, and the fullness of time 
at each and every moment, are backed up by severe religious practice, especially 
zazen. At the culminating point of religious practice “All times are the Buddha 
nature” is fully realized. Through zazen all beings in the universe are en­
lightened and all times in history manifest eternity. Yet this takes place here 
and now, at the absolute present. Apart from the here and now, apart from 
“body-and-mind-casting-off” realization at the present, this does not take 
place. Time elapses from present to present. Things in the universe are mutually 
interpenetrating, with self and others being undifferentiated yet distinct. 
This is Dogen’s world of manifestation of the Buddha nature. It must, however, 
be repeatedly emphasized this is not merely the goal but the starting point 
of Buddhist life.
In the Sansuikyd book Dogen quotes Fu-jung Tao-k‘ai’s (Fuyd Dokai n.d.) 
words “A stone-woman bears a child at night,”83 to indicate Beginning(L^»/i»^) 
from the Absolute and free subjectivity. A “Stone-woman” refers to the undiffe­
rentiated “What” as the Buddha nature. “Bear a child” may be taken as dif­
ferentiated multitude coming out of the undifferentiated “What.” It happens 
“at night” because it is beyond analytic reasoning. The words excellently sym­
bolize the Beginning of all things and freedom in Zen.
Freedom in Zen, particularity in Dogen, is different from that in Spinozism. 
In Spinoza God as the one Substance is free because he is causa sui (self-cause) 
and self-determined, while man can be free by seeing himself as part of God’s 
self-determined being. On the other hand, as has been repeatedly stated, since 
Dogen’s idea of the Buddha nature is nonsubstantial, empty, and no-Buddha- 
nature, man himself is causa sui and completely free in the sense of “What-is-it- 
that-thus-comes.” “A stone-woman bears a child at night” is simply another ex­
pression of this. However, the “night” is not the same as “the night in which...
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all cows are black,” so stated by Hegel concerning Schelling’s idea of the undif­
ferentiated identity. Hegel criticized Schelling in that manner because for the 
latter the law of identity, A=A is supreme, whereas the distinction between 
subject and object is formal and relative. On the contrary, in Dogen the dis­
tinction between subject and object, self and others, becomes clear through 
the realization of all beings’ limitlessness and the Buddha nature’s nonsub­
stantiality. One statement, “All beings are the Buddha nature,” may be rendered 
into two, inseparable statements, “All beings are absolutely all beings” and 
“the Buddha nature is absolutely the Buddha nature.”
In this sense “night” in which “A stone-woman bears a child” is much closer 
to “a bright night of nothingness of dread” in Heidegger’s philosophy. By 
referring to “onto-theo-logy” Heidegger rejects the whole Western metaphysi­
cal tradition and emphasizes nothingness instead of substance. Beings in totality 
are opened up through “night of nothingness of dread.” However, Heidegger’s 
emphasis on nothingness of dread does not necessarily lead him to the com­
pletely dehomocentric, cosmological dimension in which alone the imperma­
nence of all beings in the universe is fully realized. Only in this dimensionless 
dimension is a complete radical reversal from “impermanence is the Buddha 
nature” to “the Buddha nature is impermanence,” from “being is time” to 
“time is being,” possible. “A stone-woman bears a child at night” indicates 
the cosmo-personalistic freedom based on the realization of this reversal. It 
is self-determination without determinator, that takes place at each and every 
moment of absolute present with the boundless cosmological dimension as 
its basis. This freedom is realized in the infinite circle of religious conduct in 
which practice and enlightenment arc not two but one.
Let me conclude this lengthy discussion on Dogen’s idea of the Buddha 
nature by quoting the following conversation between Zen master Ch‘ang-sha 
Ch‘ing-tscen (Chosha Keishin, n. d.) and Minister Chu which Dogen discusses 
at the end of the Buddha nature book.
“An earthworm being cut, becomes two. Both of them move.
I wonder which contains the Buddha nature?”
The master replied,
“No illusions’”84
84 Sbobogerrzo I (BmhM), P- 341-
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